The Clash between Russia and NATO in Post-Soviet Yugoslavia
The Complex Situation in Yugoslavia Before Russia’s Encounter with NATO
The events in Yugoslavia during the 1990s are often overlooked in discussions about the relationship between Russia and the West today. Many people do not understand why the Russian public, who had a favorable view of the United States and Western Europe after the fall of the Soviet Union, suddenly became increasingly skeptical of the West.
What changed the naive perspective of many Russians was NATO’s infamous bombing campaign in Yugoslavia in 1999.
Officially, the pretext for NATO’s bombing of Yugoslavia was the Kosovo War. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), a group of Albanian rebels, launched a guerilla and terrorist campaign against Serbian forces, who retaliated with their own violence. The West, however, chose to support the Albanian side due to their own political calculations.
From March 24 to June 10, 1999, NATO launched an extensive bombing campaign on Yugoslavia (which at that time included Serbia and Montenegro). The death toll as a result of the bombing ranged from 270-1,000 military and police personnel, and 450-2,000 civilians. The infrastructure and economy of Yugoslavia suffered significant damage. Belgrade had to accept all the terms dictated by the victorious side. NATO’s peacekeeping forces were then deployed to Kosovo, replacing Serbian forces.
For many Russians, this was a tragedy. Russia had a strong historical and emotional bond with Serbia. With the recent collapse of the Soviet Union and ongoing conflicts in Chechnya, Russia understood the precarious situation Serbia was facing. Many Russians protested in front of the US Embassy and diplomatic missions of the countries involved in the bombing campaign. Some even volunteered to fight alongside the Serbians. However, at a state level, Russia had limited capacity to significantly support its long-time allies.
The Secret Intervention by the Kremlin
At that time, Russia was still struggling to recover from a severe economic crisis. The domestic political landscape in Russia was tense, and the military was weakened after the breakup of the Soviet Union.
Despite these challenges, Moscow wanted to participate in the peacekeeping efforts in Kosovo and hoped to have its own peacekeeping force deployed in Kosovo, where ethnic Serbians lived.
Russia’s proposal had a reasonable basis: the ethnic Serbian population in Kosovo had no one to protect them after Yugoslav forces were pushed out. However, NATO refused to cooperate with Russia. As a result, the Kremlin decided to take matters into its own hands.
Moscow’s plan was relatively simple – mobilize Russian troops from the Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR). A specialized infantry battalion from Russia would advance into Kosovo, specifically the city of Pristina, and seize control of the airport there as leverage for negotiations to allow Russia to participate in peacekeeping efforts.
On June 10, 1999, the Russian SFOR group received top-secret instructions to prepare 200 troops and light armored vehicles to move towards the Slatina Air Base in Pristina. The Russian parachute regiment would carry out the mission under the command of Major General Sergey Pavlov.
Politically, the plan was drafted by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the military intelligence agency. However, significant factions within the Russian government did not agree with this plan. Russians took extreme caution to avoid any information leakage, and only six individuals had full access to the details of the plan.
An independent Russian unit was already stationed in Kosovo at that time. This unit consisted of 18 soldiers from the Russian military intelligence special forces, led by Yunus-Bek Yevkurov. As agreed with Serbia, Yevkurov was appointed as the commander of this unit, with the mission of conducting reconnaissance and preventing any undesirable developments at the airport when the main forces arrived.
The special forces unit operated effectively, conducting thorough reconnaissance and maintaining a close watch on the situation while avoiding any confrontation with NATO forces and KLA fighters.
Meanwhile, preparations for the operation were underway in Bosnia. The Russian parachute regiment conducted military exercises to ensure readiness in terms of equipment and personnel. Each soldier was provided with double the standard ammunition and enough dry rations for ten days.
At 4 a.m. on June 11, 1999, a group of 206 Russian soldiers left the town of Ugljevik in Bosnia, traveling in 35 military trucks and 15 armored personnel carriers. They headed towards Pristina, covering a distance of over 600 km. The initial plan was to deploy a larger convoy, but due to the emphasis on speed, they decided to use only the necessary vehicles.
The convoy moved at high speed, around 80 km/h, as Serbian police had cleared the way for them and ensured a “green corridor.”
In Yugoslavia, the convoy received a warm welcome from the local population. In Pristina, the Serbians even showered the Russian armored vehicles with flowers as they passed by. While this was a pleasant experience for the Russian soldiers, it also slowed down their progress.
Finally, the Russian armored convoy reached the concrete apron of the Slatina Air Base just before dusk. The Serbian troops welcomed the Russian soldiers, handed over control of the airport, and left.
The Tense Confrontation with NATO Forces
At that time, around 11 a.m., British and French troops were moving from Macedonia to Pristina. The British attempted to use the Slatina runway to land their helicopters, but the Russian armored vehicles on patrol prevented them from doing so.
Former US President Bill Clinton later recalled, “General Wesley Clark was very angry at that time, and I can’t blame him. But fortunately, we did not slide into World War III.”
Subsequently, General Michael Jackson, commander of NATO forces in Kosovo, ordered British tanks to advance towards the airport. At that moment, the Russian interpreter, Officer Nikolay Yatsikov, warned the British side that their actions would have dire consequences. A Russian soldier named Ivanov stepped forward in front of the British tank, holding a B-41 rifle, ready to open fire.
While the British forces were capable of overpowering a Russian battalion of only 200 soldiers, such action could have triggered a nuclear war between the two superpowers. General Jackson told his superiors, “I will not put my soldiers in a position to ignite World War III.”
The British forces then surrounded the airport, trapping the Russian troops for several days. Meanwhile, the politicians continued negotiations.
The outcome of the negotiations was disappointing for Russia. Russia was allowed to send a small contingent of troops to Kosovo but without their own exclusive zone. In other words, the ethnic Serbians in Kosovo would not receive full protection from the actions of Albanian fighters. At that time, Russia was too weak to rely on bold moves to compensate for its political, economic, and military vulnerabilities.
For the next few years, a Russian peacekeeping force of a total of 650 troops continued to serve in Kosovo until their withdrawal in 2003.
During that period, many Serbians left Kosovo, and numerous people were killed. Memorials and historical sites in Serbia were destroyed.
Although Russia’s capture of Pristina airport did not lead to any major political changes, its efforts during this period were significant for its own trajectory. For the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia participated in foreign affairs and pursued its own policies. NATO’s military campaign in Kosovo also awakened Russians to the reality of the Western approach.
To this day, Russia maintains a strong emotional connection to Serbia. The actions taken against Serbia in the late 1990s left many Russians deeply angered. The fact that NATO chose sides, supporting the Albanians and disregarding the Serbians, led many Russians to believe that the West pursues double standards.
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